CASE Network Studies and Analyses
No. 378 European integration and domestic regions: a numerical simulation analysis by Melchior, Arne

CASE Network Studies & Analyses No. 378 - European Integration and Domestic Regions:… 
 
 
Materials published here have a working paper character. They can be subject to further 
publication. The views and opinions expressed here reflect the author(s) point of view and 
not necessarily those of CASE Network. 
 
The paper was prepared under the ENEPO project (EU Eastern Neighbourhood: Economic 
Potential and Future Development) coordinated by CASE, financed within the Sixth 
Framework Programme of the European Commission. The study includes some of the 
results of the Workpackage 3 coordinated by Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. The 
content of this publication is the sole responsibility of the authors and can in no way be taken 
to reflect the views of the European Union, CASE, or other institutions the authors may be 
affiliated to.  
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
Key words: Regional inequality, international trade, European integration. 
 
JEL codes: F12, F15, R12, O18. 
 
 
© CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw,  2009 
Graphic Design: Agnieszka Natalia Bury 
 
EAN 9788371784798 
 
Publisher:  
CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research  on behalf of CASE Network 
12 Sienkiewicza, 00-010 Warsaw, Poland 
tel.: (48 22) 622 66 27, 828 61 33, fax: (48 22) 828 60 69 
e-mail: case@case-research.eu 
http://www.case-research.eu 
CASE Network Studies & Analyses No. 378 - European Integration and Domestic Regions:… 
 
 2
 
 
The CASE Network is a group of economic and social research centers in Poland, 
Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and Belarus. Organizations in the network regularly 
conduct joint research and advisory projects. The research covers a wide spectrum of 
economic and social issues, including economic effects of the European integration process, 
economic relations between the EU and CIS, monetary policy and euro-accession, 
innovation and competitiveness, and labour markets and social policy. The network aims to 
increase the range and quality of economic research and information available to policy-
makers and civil society, and takes an active role in on-going debates on how to meet the 
economic challenges facing the EU, post-transition countries and the global economy. 
 
The CASE network consists of:  
 
 
• CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, est. 1991,  
      www.case-research.eu 
 
• CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research – Kyrgyzstan, est. 1998, 
www.case.elcat.kg 
 
• Center for Social and Economic Research - CASE Ukraine, est. 1999,  
      www.case-ukraine.kiev.ua 
 
• CASE –Transcaucasus Center for Social and Economic Research, est. 2000,  
           www.case-transcaucasus.org.ge 
 
• Foundation for Social and Economic Research CASE Moldova, est. 2003, 
www.case.com.md 
 
• CASE Belarus - Center for Social and Economic Research Belarus, est. 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE Network Studies & Analyses No. 378 - European Integration and Domestic Regions:… 
 
 3
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 
 
 
Abstract...................................................................................................................................5 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................6 
2. International integration and domestic regions: Some recent research ......................8 
3.  The modeling approach..................................................................................................11 
3.1. A synthetic European space ....................................................................................11 
3.2. Scenarios and trade costs........................................................................................12 
3.3. The choice of model..................................................................................................15 
3.4. Properties of the wage gap model:  Are wage effects and net export effects 
similar?..............................................................................................................................17 
4. Model simulation results .................................................................................................26 
5. Concluding remarks.........................................................................................................29 
References ............................................................................................................................30 
Appendix A: The modelling framework..............................................................................34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE Network Studies & Analyses No. 378 - European Integration and Domestic Regions:… 
 
 4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arne Melchior (Ph.D., international economics, University of Oslo), b. 1953, is currently 
Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, Norway, 
where he has also served as Assistant Director and Head of Department. Earlier professional 
experience includes work with international trade negotiations for the Norwegian 
government. Main research interests include: 
- Trade, trade policy, regional integration and trade preferences, in Europe and worldwide. 
- Spatial economics and domestic regional issues, e.g. in Europe, India and China. 
- Entry barriers and sunk costs in foreign trade, e.g. in the IT sector. 
- International income distribution and inequality. 
In most fields, theoretical as well as empirical work has been undertaken. Melchior has 
experience as an advisor domestically and for international institutions, and from teaching at 
various universities. For selected publications, see 
http://www.nupi.no/IPS/?module=Articles;action=Article.publicShow;ID=259.  
 
 
CASE Network Studies & Analyses No. 378 - European Integration and Domestic Regions:… 
 
 5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Does European economic integration create more inequality between domestic regions, or is 
the opposite true? We show that a general answer to this question does not exist, and that 
the outcome depends on the liberalisation scenario. In order to examine the impact of 
European and international integration on the regions, the paper develops a numerical 
simulation model with nine countries and 90 regions. Eastward extension of European 
integration is beneficial for old as well as new member countries, but within countries the 
impact varies across regions. Reduction in distance-related trade costs is particularly good 
for the European peripheries. Each liberalisation scenario has a distinct impact on the spatial 
income distribution, and there is no general rule telling that integration causes more or less 
agglomeration.  
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1. Introduction* 
 
 
How does European integration affect domestic regions? This question is urgent not 
only for those directly affected but also for policy makers: regional support constitutes a main 
component of the common policies of the European Union. In the 2007-2013 Financial 
Framework of the EU, 36% of total funds is allocated to such “cohesion activities”.1 While 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain were the main beneficiaries of EU regional support 
during the years preceding the 2004 enlargement, regions in the new member states have 
now taken over this role.  
On this background, it is of considerable interest to know whether integration as such 
tends to widen or narrow the core-periphery gaps inside countries. If the latter was to be true, 
European integration would by itself be a good regional policy, and the case for budget 
support would be weaker. Ederveen et al. (2006) find that EU structural funds are only 
effective in regions that are open or have good institutional quality. For EU policy, especially 
in the context of the EU Neighbourhood Policy (see e.g. Dodini and Fantini 2006), an urgent 
issue is whether there is an “agglomeration shadow” whereby regions outside the enlarged 
EU are worse off.  
A growing body of evidence (see e.g. World Bank 2000, Römisch 2003, Landesmann 
and Römisch 2006) suggests that regional inequality is on the rise in new member states. 
According to a recent comprehensive assessment (Melchior 2008a) covering 36 countries in 
Europe and beyond, there is no doubt: During 1995-2005, there was a substantial increase in 
domestic regional inequality within all Central and Eastern European countries. Given that 
East-West European free trade agreements and EU enlargement has been implemented 
during the last decade, an issue is therefore whether integration as such has been a cause 
for the observed increase in regional inequality. Or is it, on the contrary, the case that 
European integration promotes regional convergence within countries?  
 Existing research provides no clear answers about whether international integration 
promotes convergence or divergence between domestic regions. In section 2, we review 
some empirical work as well as some recent theoretical contributions within the new 
economic geography (NEG) and conclude that the answer to our main question is 
ambiguous in terms of theory as well as empirics. In this paper, we argue that there is no 
                                                 
* I thank Maryla Maliszewska, Fredrik Wilhelmsson and Konstantin Gluschenko for useful comments to an earlier 
draft. The paper was written as part of the research project ENEPO – European Eastern Neighbourhood – 
Economic Potential and Future development. Financial support from EUs 6th Framework programme (contract 
028736) and the Norwegian Research Council is gratefully acknowledged. 
1 See http://ec.europa.eu/budget/reform/budget_glance/what_for_en.htm.  
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general answer to this question, and searching for such a general rule is barking under the 
wrong tree.  
 As an illustration, some of our results suggest that East-West regional integration will 
have an uneven impact on western and eastern regions within former member states and the 
new members.  In the new member states, for example, western regions may be more 
stimulated by integration. Whether this contributes to more or less regional inequality, 
depends on the initial pattern of regional inequality. Furthermore, we show that the east-west 
impact of integration is quite different with other forms of international trade integration, for 
example multilateral trade liberalization of the WTO (World Trade Organization) type, or 
reduction in distance-related trade costs (such as transport costs). Hence the impact of 
international integration on domestic regional inequality depends on the type of integration as 
well as the initial income distribution. European regions have been affected by various stages 
of European integration, multilateral integration through WTO, and reductions in transport 
costs. We cannot expect that all these forms of integration have similar effects on domestic 
regions. 
In order to address such integration effects, we should not only ask whether there will 
be spatial agglomeration of economic activity, but where this agglomeration will be. Will 
international integration stimulate growth in the north, south, east or west of a country, or its 
central areas? In order to address such issues, we need models of sufficient dimensionality: 
with a sufficient number of countries, and with distinct regions within each country. In trade 
theory and the new economic geography (NEG), the issues have mainly been addressed 
using low-dimensional models with three or four regions (see Section 2 for references). Many 
questions about European integration and domestic regions can however not be addressed 
within such models. Concluding their survey of the new economic geography (NEG), Fujita 
and Mori (2005) consider the development of higher-dimensional spatial models as one of 
the top priorities for future research in the field.2  
The ambition in this paper is therefore to develop a higher-dimensional model for the 
study of European integration, in order to highlight the issue and develop a platform for 
empirical work in the field. In this way, we try to move from economic geography to 
geographical economics, by developing a model that is directly applicable to the empirical 
analysis of spatial development patterns in Europe. As another contribution in a related field, 
Stelder (2005) uses a large-scale NEG model to examine the location of cities in Europe. 
Except for this contribution we are not aware of similar large-scale models, although some 
regional CGE (Computable General Equilibrium) models may be partly related although 
                                                 
2 The authors list four priority areas, and the others were; (i) unifying urban economics and NEG, (iii) better 
modeling and empirical understanding of transport costs and how it affects agglomeration, and (iv) exploring the 
impact of spatial knowledge spillovers. 
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these are mainly focusing on the national level only (see e.g. Bröcker and Schneider 2002). 
Multi-regional modeling has certainly been used also in the NEG context; see e.g. Fujita et 
al. (1999), but then mainly to answer questions about “whether” there will be agglomeration. 
In the current paper, we extend this by focusing more on the “where” question, and derive 
implications that can be applied to the map and used directly in the empirical study of 
geographical patterns of change in Europe. For example, we ask whether integration will 
have different impact in the west and in the east, within Europe as a whole and within each 
country.  
 In Section 2, we survey some recent research in the field. In Section 3, we discuss 
and motivate the theoretical modeling approach chosen and define the integration scenarios 
to be examined. We present the technical properties of the theoretical model and examine 
the behaviour of the model in a low-dimensional setting, before proceeding to the higher-
dimensional numerical simulations. In section 4, we present the results from the modeling of 
various stages of regional and international integration affecting European regions.  Some 
concluding remarks are presented in Section 5.  
 
 
2. International integration and domestic regions: Some recent 
research 
 
 
The new economic geography (NEG) (see Ottaviano and Thisse 2004 or Fujita and 
Mori 2005 or Fujita et al. 1999 for overviews, or Puga 1999 for a synthesis of some core 
models) provides a new micro-foundation for examining regional inequality. Some NEG 
contributions have also examined the relationship between international integration and 
domestic inequalities. In models of economic geography there is typically a centrifugal force 
working against agglomeration, and a centripetal force promoting a more uneven core-
periphery pattern. Appearing in various shapes and embedded in different models, the 
standard engine for agglomeration is often the so-called “home market effect” demonstrated 
by Krugman (1980): Industries with economies of scale and imperfect competition tend to be 
located where market access is better. In Krugman (1980) it was the home market that 
created better market access, but it may also be a more favourable geographical location. 
  
If workers are allowed to migrate in response to real wage differences, as in Krugman 
(1991), it amplifies market size differences, and regional inequality will increase. In this 
model, the centrifugal force is that workers in the “agricultural” sector are immobile and 
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maintain an incentive to locate firms close to peripheral demand.  Allowing labour to migrate 
between domestic regions but not internationally, it may then be studied how migration and 
domestic agglomeration is affected by international trade integration. Within such a 
framework, Paluzie (2001) and Monfort and Nicolini (2000) find that international 
liberalisation makes domestic agglomeration more likely. Monfort and Ypersele (2003) 
obtained similar results in a model without labour migration but with vertical linkages between 
industries. It is well known in the new economic geography literature (see e.g. Puga 1999) 
that the NEG labour migration model and the model with vertical inter-industry linkages of 
Krugman and Venables (1995) produce rather similar results.  
The results outlined above are derived in models where domestic regions are 
symmetrically placed related to foreign countries or region, so there is no geographical core-
periphery pattern. Crozet and Sobeyran (2004) also examined the asymmetric case where 
one domestic region is closer to the outside world.  Now the conclusion about integration and 
regions is reversed: International integration promotes development in the border region.3 A 
similar conclusion was obtained by Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996), who replace the 
centripetal force working against concentration: When agglomeration is dampened by 
domestic congestion costs instead of immobile farmers, international integration also leads to 
less domestic concentration.4 
 What is the intuition behind these results? International integration makes intra-
national trade less important and this weakens the forces for concentration as well as for 
dispersion:  
- It weakens the “monopoly” of the domestic core region by facilitating the periphery’s trade 
with the outside world, and this may promote convergence. The intuition may also be 
expressed as follows: It is borders that create the backwardness of some border regions, 
and when borders are made less important, domestic core-periphery patterns are 
weakened.  
- On the other hand, increased demand from abroad also strengthens the incentive for 
agglomeration. In models where domestic real wage differences are ruled out since they 
lead to labour migration, international integration is then more likely to produce 
agglomeration. 
                                                 
3 Another contribution considering spatial asymmetries, regions and international trade is Behrens et al. (2006). 
Using a model with two countries each having two regions, they show, among other things, how the probabilities 
of agglomeration in the two countries are interdependent.   
4 See also Alonso-Villar (2005). Behrens (2003) also shows that some of these results depend on the Dixit-Stiglitz 
modelling approach where the firms’ mill prices are unaffected by trade costs and changes in competition. If 
changes in competition lead to changes in prices, the share of trade costs in total costs may change, and this may 
change the results. 
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From the still limited amount of theoretical research on this issue, it is therefore ambiguous 
whether international integration promotes convergence or divergence between domestic 
regions.  
This ambiguity also applies to empirics.  Some evidence indicates that international 
integration leads to more inequality: Summing up the results from a large-scale United 
Nations research project, Kanbur and Venables (2007, 209) conclude that “trade has on 
balance increased spatial disparities”. Hanson (see e.g. Hanson 2003) has examined the 
impact of NAFTA on wages in Mexico and found that integration led to greater regional wage 
dispersion but a gain for more skilled labour close to the U.S. border.5 Egger et al. (2005) 
found that export openness increased regional inequality with respect to real wages in 
Central and Eastern Europe. This evidence is important; it is however not a direct test of the 
mechanisms described in the theoretical models above.  
On the other hand, there is also evidence suggesting that international integration 
promotes regional convergence:  
- Crozet and Soubeyran (2004) interpret their evidence about labour migration in Romania 
as support for the hypothesis that European integration has been to the advantage of 
border regions, as predicted by their model.  
- Redding and Sturm (2005) found that the division of Germany during 1945-1990 had a 
particularly negative impact on border regions; thus indicating that disintegration 
contributed to stronger core-periphery pattern. They also found signs of recovery for 
border regions after reunification. 
Hence also empirically, some contributions suggest convergence and others divergence.6 
Based on earlier research, the impact of international integration on domestic regions is 
therefore ambiguous theoretically as well as empirically. 
 Except for the border region of Crozet and Soubeyran (2004), the theoretical models 
referred to above are essentially similar to trade bloc models containing three or four regions, 
with a limited spatial structure. It is therefore of interest to examine the issue in models where 
geographical location and distance plays a larger role. In order to obtain this, one needs 
greater dimensionality. Melchior (2000), using a 49-region multilateral version of the home 
market effect (HME) model of Krugman (1980), distinguishes between “spatial” trade costs 
(such as transport costs) and non-spatial trade costs (such as tariffs) and found that “spatial 
liberalisation” tends to promote more centralisation, while reductions in non-spatial trade 
costs tend to have the opposite effect. The distinction between spatial and non-spatial trade 
costs is also examined by Behrens et al. (2007), who study agglomeration effects with gated 
                                                 
5 According to Aroca et al. 2005), it was stagnation in South Mexico rather than prosperity in North Mexico that 
caused the divergence in incomes. 
6 Some research focuses on other variables; e.g. that international integration promotes more similar export 
structures; see Beine and Coulombe (2007)and  Crespo and Fontoura (2007). 
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regions, and it will be an important element in the modelling undertaken here. Spatial trade 
costs allow the forces of geography and distance to work properly, while non-spatial costs 
allow the modelling of countries and trade blocs. When the two types are combined, one 
generally obtains effects that are distinct from those that apply with each of them alone.  
 
 
3.  The modeling approach 
 
3.1. A synthetic European space 
 
In the theoretical analysis, we use a two-dimensional rectangular grid of 9 countries 
divided into 90 regions. Diagram 1 illustrates this “synthetic” European space: 
 
Diagram 1: A stylised European space with 90 regions
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In the diagram, each dot represents a region of equal size in terms of population or labour 
force. Eight of the countries have nine regions each, while the last North-East country, E3, 
has 18. While the map is highly stylized, the idea is to capture aspects of the true European 
space. The four countries W1-W4 to the left represent the “old EU” or Western Europe 
whereas C1-C2 represent the “new members” or Central Europe. Eastern Europe is 
represented by E1-E3, of which one (E1) is a large, long and narrow country which is meant 
to capture some dimensions of Russia. E2 could in terms of geographic position resemble 
Turkey or Ukraine and E3 might represent Eurasian countries further east. The 90-region 
landscape has distinct North-South and even more East-West dimensions; there is a 
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sufficiently rich regional structure inside each country, and we have a sufficient number of 
countries to study different integration scenarios, and their impact on insiders and outsiders.7  
The map in Diagram 1 captures some aspects of the true European space but we should 
nevertheless be aware of the limitations: 
- There is no outside world so the model will tend to overestimate the isolation of regions at 
the borders of the landscape. Given that e.g. regions in the Russian Far East is now 
benefiting from more intensive trade with China, USA and others, this is a limitation.  
- The landscape is stylized and misses many features of true geography, which has more 
countries, oceans, lakes, mountains, climatic differences and so on. For example, the 
results for “W1” may not be appropriate in order to assess the impact of European 
integration on Nordic regions. The North-South dimension is limited and allows limited 
analysis of e.g. EU enlargement towards the South and North. This is a deliberate choice 
since our focus here is particularly on the East-West dimension. 
Neary (2001, 551) also calls for two-dimensional extensions of NEG models but fears they 
will be “long on trigonometry and short on elegance”! With a richer landscape it is inevitably 
the case that the effects and results are also more complex. By choosing the rectangular grid 
rather than true geography, it is nevertheless easier to see the principal results in a stylized 
way. In order to show how the core model affects the results, we shall also proceed in two 
steps, by exploring the model properties in a low-dimensional setting before proceeding to 
the 90-region landscape. 
 
3.2. Scenarios and trade costs 
 
A core feature of the approach used here is that we include some trade costs that are 
a function of distance, and others that are independent of distance. We call the first spatial 
trade costs, and the second non-spatial. As shown by Melchior (2000); when the two types 
are present simultaneously one obtains effects on the spatial distribution of activity or 
incomes that are not present when each is considered in isolation. We may think of 
spatial trade costs as transport costs, but it could also be the case that policy-shaped 
barriers or regulations have a spatial dimension. For example, if geographical distance also 
reflects institutional similarity it could be that standards and regulations are more similar in 
countries and regions that are close to each other and their protective impact could then be 
correlated with distance. The relationship between transport costs and distance is also not 
                                                 
7 Before choosing this format, we also experimented with a more geographically realistic approach using up to 
more than 500 regions, using true regional map coordinates. It is however an illusion that the model is much more 
realistic even if the coordinates are true: After all, it is only theory. With a more stylised landscape, it is easier to 
interpret the results and we avoid some technical computation problems that are present in models with larger 
scale and variable region size. 
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straightforward: while e.g. the costs of road transportation in Europe may be monotonously 
increasing with distance, this may not be so clear for long-distance sea freight. Similarly, we 
may think of trade policy barriers as non-spatial and this is certainly the case for e.g. a Most-
Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff applying to all countries. But if countries form trade blocs with 
their neighbours only, there may also be a correlation between trade policy barriers and 
distance. In the analysis here, trade costs represent distribution costs in general, and it is an 
empirical issue which trade costs are spatial and non-spatial. In the European context, the 
European internal market is a large-scale project containing thousands of reforms, of which 
some may be spatial and others non-spatial. 
 In the model simulations, trade costs always include a spatial as well as a non-spatial 
component: 
- Spatial trade costs are present within as well as between nations. We use the notation 
dij=βd*Dij/Dmax. Here Dij is the “geographical” distance in Diagram 1; varying from one 
between adjacent regions up to the maximum, Dmax≈14.03.  We divide by Dmax so the 
right hand side ratio is maximum equal to one. βd is a scaling factor, which we use to 
scale up or down the magnitude of spatial trade costs.  
- We assume that there are non-spatial trade costs present between all regions, also within 
nations. We use three levels; within nations (tdomestic), between regions in different nations 
but within the same trade bloc (trta, where the rta subscript refers to some regional trade 
agreement), and between regions in different nations that have made no special 
integration agreement (tmfn, where mfn refers to Most Favoured Nation). We always 
assume tdomestic<trta<tmfn and for simplicity we let the level for regional integration be mid-
way between the domestic and MFN barriers. If we had allowed tdomestic=trta countries 
would not exist any more. Since international trade costs are always higher than the 
domestic ones, countries continue to matter in all scenarios.   
We will simulate the following ten scenarios: 
1. A base case without any regional integration agreements (BASE). The results are not 
reported in detail, but it is used as a yardstick for comparing the results of regional 
integration. 
2. Western integration (WEST): A regional integration agreement is formed among the four 
countries to the west (W1-W4). This is meant to represent the earlier stages of integration 
in Western Europe.  
3. Iron curtain (IRON): Prohibitive barriers are erected between WEST countries and the 
rest. By reversing the sign of the predicted effect, we check the impact of the fall of the 
iron curtain.  
4. West-Central integration (WIDER): The Central European countries C1 and C2 are 
added to the regional integration scheme. This intended to capture aspects of the 
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eastward extension of European integration; through various free trade agreements and 
finally EU enlargement. 
5. Multilateral integration (WTO): We examine the impact of changes in tmfn, with no 
changes in the other trade cost components. This sheds light on the impact of multilateral 
liberalization and also “preference erosion” whereby the intra-European preference 
margin is reduced. 
6. Eastern integration (EAST): We examine the impact of integration between the three 
countries to the east; E1-E3. This may be relevant for discussing the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union as well as current integration efforts within CIS (the Commonwealth of 
Independent States). 
7. Reduced transport costs (SPATIAL):  We examine the impact of reduced spatial trade 
costs, while all other trade costs remain unchanged. In this way, we check how regions 
could be affected by the “death of distance”, or more realistically a reduction in its costs. 
8. Further eastward extension of integration (EAST-WEST): E2 joins the regional integration 
agreement and we examine the national and regional impact. This could be relevant for 
assessing further EU enlargements or free trade agreements to the South East, e.g. with 
Ukraine or Turkey. 
9. Unilateral liberalization in the East (EASTOPEN): We explore the impact of unilateral 
liberalization in an eastern country (E2). In this case we simulate the outcome with 
initially trade costs higher than tmfn; and the impact of reducing these to tmfn. Transition 
and WTO membership have led to a significant reduction in trade costs in some Eastern 
European countries, and this scenario is intended to capture such changes.  
10. Capital region dominance (CAPITAL): In Central and Eastern Europe there has been 
faster growth in capital regions and a potential explanation is that some nations have a 
hub-and-spoke pattern where the capital is a hub. We try to capture this by assuming that 
half of the trade of regions in the three eastern countries E1-E3 has to pass through their 
capital. We may think of this literally as if goods have to be transported via the capital, or 
– perhaps more plausibly – that other aspects of distribution and sales are related to the 
capital. In order to model this, we designate capitals based on the outcome of earlier 
simulations and recalculate the matrix of trade costs. We use the three eastern countries 
as illustrations, but have no à priori prediction about where such capital hub effects are 
relevant. Brülhart and Koenig (2006) tested what they called the “Comecon hypothesis” 
and found that for wages and service employment, capital regions in five of the new EU 
member states (with respect to the 2004 enlargement) were better off. Hence this 
scenario may potentially be relevant also for Central European countries. In Melchior 
(2008a) it is shown that higher regional inequality invariably corresponds to a larger 
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income gap between capital regions and the country average, and this applies to Central 
as well as Eastern European countries. 
 
3.3. The choice of model 
 
Models of the new trade theory and NEG are well-suited for our purpose since in such 
models, industrial location or income levels are affected by market access. The archetype 
version of this argument is the “home market effect” (HME) model of Krugman (1980): In this 
model, large countries tend to be net exporters with respect to a “manufacturing” sector with 
scale economies, monopolistic competition and trade costs. While most models of the new 
trade theory and NEG have shared this focus on net export effects, Krugman (ibid.) 
demonstrated that market access could alternatively show up in the form of nominal wage 
differences rather than net trade effects. In their survey of empirical work on the new 
economic geography, Head and Mayer (2004, 2663) conclude that the relationship between 
market access and wages is more robustly supported than the relationship between market 
access and the structure of production. Empirical research therefore strengthens the case for 
models with endogenous wages rather than net trade effects. In this paper, we therefore 
depart from Krugman’s idea about nominal wage effects and develop a multilateralised 
version which we call the “wage gap model”. In the analysis, we compare this to a multilateral 
version of the HME model and argue that the wage gap model is indeed a plausible 
alternative. 
 A multilateral version of the HME model was applied to the analysis of spatial 
inequality by Melchior (1997, 2000) or more recently Behrens et al. (2005, 2007).8 In the 
multi-region setting, the HME model has the advantage of simplicity: It has a simple matrix-
form solution so numerical exercises can be carried out with little technical difficulty. Hence 
the model has some of the virtues requested by Fujita and Mori in their quest for developing 
high-dimensional models (2005, 396); “A most desirable model would be one that has 
solvability at the low dimensional setup and computability even at the fairly high dimensional 
setup.” The drawback, however, is that for the HME model, a solution with positive 
production in all regions only exists within a restricted range of parameter values. Helpman 
and Krugman (1985, Chapter 10.3) showed that even in the two-region case, the range with 
positive production in both regions is limited in the HME model. In the case with many 
regions, this problem is severely aggravated. The implication for numerical modeling is that 
                                                 
8 In addition to the “manufacturing” sector referred to above, there is a numeraire sector which is freely traded at 
zero cost and produced with constant returns to scale. When labour is the only factor of production, free trade 
with the numeraire good equalizes wages in all regions/countries (provided they all produce that good). With no 
nominal wage differences, any advantage in market access or home market size is reflected in larger production 
in the differentiated goods sector. Since large countries obtain a more than proportionate share of production, we 
obtain the HME effect. 
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the model is “sustainable” only for quite high levels of trade costs, limited region size 
differences, and a high elasticity of substitution. This severely limits the applicability of the 
HME model in high-dimensional modeling. Another limitation of the HME model is the 
somewhat arbitrary assumptions about the numeraire sector. This sector is sometimes 
referred to as “agriculture”, but it is empirically not very plausible that there is completely free 
trade for agriculture but not manufacturing. As shown by Davis (1998) (and discussed further 
in Fujita et al. 1999, Chapter 7), the HME disappears if trade costs are equal in the two 
sectors. 9 In spite of these limitations of the HME model, the model demonstrates in an 
extreme form a powerful mechanism that is present also in other models and crucial in the 
whole NEG literature.  
 Based on these arguments, we choose in this paper to develop an alternative model 
with endogenous wage differences instead of net export effects. Following Krugman (1980) 
and dropping the numeraire sector in the HME model, we obtain a model where wage 
differences are driven by differences in market access. Dispensing with sector differences 
and collapsing the economy into one sector, using one sector and one factor of production 
only, we can think of this as a “sector average” for the economy. To this we may later add 
other features: Sector differences in trade costs or technology, adding more production 
factors and so on. 10 Ideally, we would like to have net trade effects as well as wage effects 
simultaneously, but – given the dimensionality of the model – we start with wage effects only.  
 We call this the wage gap model since differences in market access are reflected in 
the form of different nominal and real wages. While this is our main approach, we shall also 
retain the HME model as part of the analysis and compare the two models: Are the wage 
effects in the wage gap model just a mirror of the net export effects in the HME model? As 
we shall see, this is sometimes but not always the case.  
 An alterative choice might have been to use NEG models along the lines of Krugman 
(1991) or Krugman and Venables (1995). While these models have some interesting 
properties, they generally generate multiple equilibria and even in the simple two-region case 
the analysis of stability can be demanding. For the purpose at hand, with 90 regions, we 
deliberately avoid models with multiple equilibria.11 With many possible equilibria and no 
yeardstick to choose between them, it may be difficult to evaluate the results coming from 
                                                 
9 Also if we replace the numeraire sector with another “Dixit-Stiglitz sector” with trade costs, the HME effect may 
disappear and the pattern of specialization and trade will depend on differences in elasticities and trade costs 
across the two sectors. As shown by Venables (1999) in a two-dimensional setting (a circular plain), a complex 
“chess-board-like” pattern of alternating specialization may then occur. 
10 For example, the model of Markusen and Venables (1998) adds a Heckscher-Ohlin type supply-side to the 
HME model so that market access differences will affect wages as well as net exports. Exploring how this model 
performs in a higher-dimensional setting is a task for future research. In a higher-dimensional setting, the 
technical challenge increases with the number of unknowns, e.g. two factor prices for each country rather than 
one. 
11 With two regions, we obtain bifurcations and the well-known “Tomahawk diagram” (see e.g. Fujita et al. 1999, 
68). With 90 regions, “star wars” would be a possibility! 
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numerical simulations. For the purpose of analyzing European regional income distributions, 
we are also interested in a model which allows for a continuum of possible outcomes rather 
than catastrophic agglomeration in one region. European peripheral regions are generally not 
empty, but they have lower nominal and real incomes and we would like the model to capture 
this. Nevertheless, our choice is mainly for technical reasons and an interesting extension 
might be to develop more multi-region application of the NEG models with ad hoc dynamics, 
labour migration or externalities.  
 
3.4. Properties of the wage gap model:  Are wage effects and net 
export effects similar? 
 
In Appendix A, the technical details of the model are presented. Here we shall 
illustrate some of the properties of the model. We start by examining the model in a low-
dimensional setting, before proceeding to the 90-region simulations. 
 Some basic properties of the wage gap model are: 
- Since there is only one sector in the economy overall trade has to be balanced so there is 
only intra-intra-industry trade.12  
- Given that trade is balanced, domestic consumption and production of the differentiated 
goods must be equal. For this reason, the number of firms will be proportional to country 
size.  
- Wage levels will however differ and for this reason the value of production and 
consumption will also differ across countries. 
- Welfare is equal to the nominal wage divided by the price level; i.e. for region i per capita 
welfare will be Xi=wi/Pi. Regions with a favourable location close to markets will have 
lower price levels. In general, we will see from the results that effects via the price levels 
are larger than the nominal wage changes. 
In Appendix A, we also include the HME model as a parallel case which we use as a 
yardstick for comparison and a useful contrast that sheds light on the results. In the following, 
we shall also compare the two models since it usefully sheds light on how net export effects 
and wage effects may differ. Given that net export effects play a key role in most NEG 
models, this exercise has broader relevance. 
Does the wage gap model live up to the requirement of low-dimensional solvability 
and high-dimensional computability?  Based on our experience, the answer is generally yes 
with respect to computability. The model has a solution although we cannot guarantee that it 
has always a positive and real solution for all possible parameter values. In the simulations 
                                                 
12 We cannot exclude “triangular” trade so that there is a trade imbalance bilaterally, but aggregate trade always 
has to be balanced. 
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undertaken, the model was well-behaved with positive solutions. Hence the model seems 
well-behaved in terms of computability. Solvability for low dimensions is trickier: Although an 
explicit analytical can be found for the case of two regions and with the elasticity of 
substitution ε=2 (see end of Appendix A), this solution is not very user-friendly and one has 
to use numerical methods to check its properties.  
As a first illustration, we may use this analytical solution for two regions in order to 
shed some light on the properties of the wage gap model. In Diagram two, we assume that 
region 1 is twice as large as region 2; i.e. the labour endowment ratio L=L1/L2=2. Diagram 2 
shows the wage ratio w1/w2 when trade costs are varied. In this low-dimension case, there is 
only one type of trade costs, t12=t21=t. 
 
Diagram 2: Trade liberalisation and the wage ratio
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Here trade costs vary from zero (t=1) and 300% (t=4). At high levels of trade costs, we can 
(using the expression for w in Appendix A) find that the wage ratio converges to L1/3; in this 
case approximately 1.26. When trade costs are lowered, the wage gap is gradually 
eliminated. Some implications of this are:   
- In the two-region case, reduction in trade costs reduces the wage difference between 
large and small countries/regions. There is a monotonous relationship and not an 
“inverse U” relationship as in some NEG models. Hence this is a NEG model without 
bifurcations.  
- For a given size distribution of regions, there is an upper bound on the nominal wage 
inequality when t increases; in the case with two regions and ε=2 it is equal to L1/3. 
Observe however that since the limit value is a function of L, there is no upper limit on the 
wage ratio when L increases. 
- The HME model has the paradoxical property that while agglomeration is created by 
differences in market access, the effect becomes stronger when these differences are 
reduced. In this sense the wage gap model is more plausible: Trade liberalization 
reduces the wage gap. Furthermore, the difference between price indexes must also be 
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reduced when differences in market access disappear, so liberalization will lead to 
converging welfare levels. Hence small countries must gain more from trade 
liberalization, while in the HME model the welfare gain from liberalization is proportional 
across countries.  
- Compared to the HME model, the wage gap model is well-behaved with positive 
solutions for a larger range of parameter values. Although negative and complex roots 
can also be observed, the problem is marginal compared to the HME model.  
According to this first check, it therefore appears that the wage gap model is more plausible 
then the HME model, by being better-behaved and by eliminating the paradoxical outcomes 
of the HME model at low levels of trade costs.   
In order to examine further some properties that are relevant for spatial modeling, we 
next compare the two models using a “Hotelling” world where regions of equal size are 
dispersed evenly along a line. If trade costs are increasing exponentially with distance in this 
setting; i.e. tij=t|i-j| where t>1 is the trade cost between adjacent regions, and i and j denote 
the positions along the line, i,j=1,..,N, the HME model has a simple analytical solutions for an 
arbitrary number of regions (see Melchior 1997, Chapter 3). With no migration, demand from 
the peripheries (ends of the line) represents the centrifugal force, and the manufacturing 
clusters are located in the regions next to the periphery. Diagram 3 illustrates such a HME 
model, using ε=5 and t=1.5. In Diagram 4, we illustrate the wage gap model for the same set-
up, using numerical simulation. 
 
                         
Diagram 3: 7-region HME model
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Diagram 4: 7-region wage gap model
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The HME model (Diagram 3), produces a duocentric or bipolar pattern of manufacturing 
agglomeration, where regions 2 and 6 have higher levels of “manufacturing” production, and 
the peripheral regions 1 and 7 lower. The central regions 3-5 have average levels of 
production (=1/N), but they have a better geographical location and therefore the welfare 
levels of regions 2 through 6 are equal. In this model, reduction of trade costs leaves 
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production in the central regions unaffected but increases the gap between regions 2,6 and 
1,7. For sufficiently low trade costs, the peripheral regions 1,7 will be deindustrialised.13  
Now consider the wage gap model to the right, in Diagram 4. It produces a smooth 
monocentric core-periphery pattern without distinct agglomerations. Nominal wages (the 
curve in the middle) are slightly higher in the central regions, but price levels are also lower 
so the welfare (real wage) gaps are even higher. The “duocentric” pattern is however visible 
in the lowest curve for domestic sales: Due to lower wages in the peripheral regions, and 
lower price levels in the central regions, regions 2 and 6 now export less and become more 
closed, with a higher share of production sold domestically. This is diametrically opposite to 
the HME model where the 2,6 regions are “big traders”. 
In the two models, the welfare results are similar in the sense that they are both 
monocentric. This may indicate that welfare predictions may be considered as more robust 
and less dependent on modeling assumptions than predictions about agglomeration or wage 
changes. To some extent, we may be more agnostic about whether the main impact is on the 
net trade pattern or income as long as the welfare effects are more comparable.  
For empirical analysis, a useful property of the wage gap model is that it offers 
predictions about nominal variables: nominal wage effects may differ from welfare results 
and frequently, price level effects are more important than nominal changes and appropriate 
handling of the real/nominal distinction may be quite important. Nominal changes are not 
“nuisance” that should be cleaned away to approach the real things; they may be important 
for understanding change.  
Using simulations with the HME model, Melchior (2000) found that the relative 
magnitude of “spatial” and “non-spatial” trade costs determined whether a duocentric or (in a 
two-dimensional model) “manufacturing belt” outcome occurred, or a more centralized 
outcome. With a higher level of non-spatial trade costs, a centralized pattern may be the 
outcome even in the HME model. In order to illustrate this, we add a non-spatial trade cost 
that applies to sales to all other regions, together with the spatial or transport-cost type of 
trade costs. We then examine what happens when either type of trade costs is changed. 
Diagrams 5 and 6 show the outcomes in the HME model (the number of firms) and the wage 
gap model (the nominal wage), respectively.14  
 
                                                 
13 When tε-1=2 the peripheral regions will have zero production. For example, with ε=5 the peripheries will be de-
industrialised for t lower than 1.19.  
 
14 In both diagrams we use ε=5, spatial trade costs that are 1/6*distance (i.e. =100% between the peripheral 
regions which have distance 6), and in the “high” curve in the graph non-spatial trade costs=0.2 for sales in all 
regions except own region. Hence spatial trade costs now increase linearly with distance. Total trade costs with 
other regions are then 1+1/6*distance+0.2. In Diagram 6 non-spatial trade costs=0 for the “low” curve. With these 
value, however, regions 1 and 7 obtain negative production in the HME model, so in Diagram 5 we use non-
spatial costs at 0.05  for the “low” curve.  
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Diagram 5: Non-spatial trade costs in the 
HME model: Levels of production
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Diagram 6: The impact of non-spatial 
trade costs in the wage gap model: 
Nominal wage 
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In both cases, the introduction of non-spatial trade costs creates a more even distribution. In 
the HME model, there is a radical change from the duocentric to a monocentric pattern of 
agglomeration, and the sharp inequality between the two regions at each end of the line and 
the rest has disappeared. In the wage gap model, the wage distribution is still monocentric 
but with less inequality than before. There is a significant increase in the nominal wages of 
the peripheral regions, and reduced nominal wages in the central regions. Changes in 
welfare are similar but more modest.  
If we reverse the sequence in both models, moving from “with” to “without” in the 
diagrams, it is evident that, a reduction in non-spatial trade costs will create more regional 
inequality. In the HME model, liberalization will also promote a movement from a 
“monocentric” pattern of agglomeration to the duocentric or bipolar pattern that obtains in the 
HME model without non-spatial trade costs.15  
Now turn to the reduction of spatial trade costs: We start from the situation described 
by the “with” curve in Diagrams 5 and 6, and reduce the spatial trade costs only.16 Diagrams 
7 and 8 show the outcome, for the HME and the wage gap models respectively: 
 
                                                 
15 Observe that we still have no country borders, so we only have regions but no countries. In the simulations to 
be undertaken, we also let regions form countries, and in that context the impact of spatial liberalization may be 
modified. 
16 We reduce the scaling parameter for spatial trade costs from 1/6 to 0.05.  
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Diagram 7: Spatial trade liberalisation in the 
HME model. Production levels.
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Diagram 8: Spatial trade liberalisation in the 
wage gap model: Nominal wage levels
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Contrary to the case with non-spatial liberalization where the outcome was similar, the 
impact of liberalization in the two models is now diametrically opposite: In the HME model, 
spatial trade liberalization leads to a stronger core-periphery pattern, while in the wage gap 
model the opposite is the case. Spatial liberalization weakens the centrifugal force of the 
model; peripheries can now be served from the central areas and there is no wage 
adjustment stopping the relocation of production toward the centre. But in the wage gap 
model, spatial trade liberalization is to the advantage of the peripheral regions. Later, we 
shall see that this also applies in the simulations with our stylized European map. 
These results show that the modeling approach may be crucial for some of the 
results in spatial models. In our simulations, we should therefore be aware about the 
sensitivity of results to the modeling assumptions, and in particular the model choice. In 
general, we consider the results from the wage gap model as more intuitive since the model 
is technically more well-behaved, and is does not have the counterintuitive properties related 
to the impact of trade liberalization.  Nevertheless, we cannot exclude the possibility that 
“duocentric” outcomes and the net export effects of the HME model, with stronger relocation 
effects, are empirically relevant. We shall therefore carry out simulations also with the HME 
model, and check whether results differ between the two modeling approaches. 
In the simulations, we use different levels of trade costs in order to check the 
sensitivity of results with respect to the levels of trade costs. There is generally no “U-shape” 
in our model so that agglomeration is stronger at intermediate levels of trade costs; it is 
nevertheless possible that integration effects depend on the level of trade costs. A reason for 
this is that trade liberalization is generally not neutral with respect to the ratio between spatial 
and non-spatial trade costs. An illustration is the following: Assume that trade costs to a 
neighbour region a are ta1=1+0.2+0.2=1.4; where the two terms equal to 0.2 represent 
spatial and non-spatial trade costs, respectively. To a region b twice as far away, we assume 
that trade costs are tb1=1+0.4+0.2=1.6, since distance costs are doubled. Now cut both types 
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of trade costs by half, so that new trade costs are ta2=1.2 and tb2=1.3. We see that 
ta1/tb1<ta2/tb2. A proportional reduction in all trade costs thus tends to make spatial trade costs 
relatively less important, and this might affect the model outcome.  
In Table B1, Appendix B, we show the parameter values used in the various 
simulations. We call these “High”, “Main” and “Low” and we will generally report only results 
from the “Main” alternative with an intermediate level of trade costs. Table B2 shows the 
average level of trade costs for trade between regions in different countries in one of the 
scenarios (the WEST scenario). We see that the average level of trade cost is around 25% 
in the “Low” scenario, around 50% in the “Main scenario” and around 200% in the “High” 
scenario. In spite of the suggestion by Anderson and van Wijnkoop (2003) that total trade 
costs broadly defined, including distribution costs, could be as high as 170%, we consider 
the level in our “High” scenario as somewhat exaggerated. However, that is the level 
required if all regions are to have positive production in all scenarios in the HME model. We 
include this in order to be able to run simulations with the HME model in parallel to the wage 
gap model. We wish to include HME simulations in order to check whether the regional 
patterns of sector agglomeration effects are similar to outcome in the wage gap model.   
In the analysis, our main concern is about changes from one scenario to another. 
Hence we are interested in e.g. how the change from WEST to WIDER affects income and 
welfare. The main purpose is not to explain the current income distribution in Europe, but to 
examine how this is affected by changes in market access.  Hence we do not try to calibrate 
the model to some actual distribution, but choose a configuration of parameter values that 
appears plausible and technically feasible, and then examine changes from there. Using the 
wage gap model, we obtain an income distribution similar to diagram 4, with modestly higher 
wages and welfare in the central regions of the rectangular grid. Diagram 9 shows welfare 
levels in the “base case” before any regional blocs are formed, with intermediate level of 
trade costs.  
 
CASE Network Studies & Analyses No. 378 - European Integration and Domestic Regions:… 
 
 24
 
 
 
We observe a core-periphery pattern with lower welfare particularly in regions far to 
the west and east. Observe also the high welfare level in E1, due to the market access 
advantage of larger country size. Given that this situation without integration might represent 
the post-war situation in the 1940s and 1950s, it is evident that there was communism in the 
Soviet Union. In the model used here, results are driven by market forces and it is therefore 
inadequate to explain welfare changes during the Soviet period. For the Soviet/ COMECON 
period, the results may therefore be of limited relevance. For Western Europe (the four 
countries W1-W4), however, the pattern with peripheries in the west and higher incomes in 
W3+W4 is quite plausible in the light of empirical research (see e.g. Combes and Overman 
2004 or Dall’erba 2005), although the true European map is certainly richer than ours.  
From this starting point, we examine how regional distribution is affected in the 10 
scenarios. In tables B3-B5 in Appendix B, we show correlation coefficients between results 
using different levels of trade costs. We also show how results with the HME model, 
available for a high level of trade costs, are correlated with the results using the wage gap 
model. These tables provide another check of the robustness of results. The general 
conclusions are:  
- The results are robust with respect to the level of trade costs since similar results are 
obtained with low, intermediate and high trade costs. In general, the absolute values of 
the correlation coefficients are above 0.9 in most cases.17 For example, for the WIDER 
scenario, welfare results in the wage gap model are correlated with a correlation 
                                                 
17 Observe that the sign depends on which variable is involved; welfare and wages are positively correlated in the 
wage gap model, and the same applies to domestic sales and the price index; but these two pairs of variables are 
negatively correlated.  
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coefficient between 0.94 and 0.99 (Table B3), and changes in welfare from scenario 
WEST to WIDER are correlated with coefficients at 0.95-0.99 (Table B4).  
- For the HME model, domestic sales (i.e. in own region) is an appropriate indicator also 
for per capita welfare (see Appendix A). Hence we observe from Table B3 that welfare in 
the HME model with WIDER is highly correlated with welfare in the wage gap model 
(absolute value of correlation coefficient=0.97), and this also applies to the welfare 
change (0.98, see Table B4).  
- For production levels in the HME model, however, correlations with results from the wage 
gap model are still significant but in most cases lower. For example, with high trade 
costs, the number of firms under WIDER using the HME model, and the wages obtained 
using the wage model, are positively correlated with a coefficient of 0.56. Hence the 
spatial pattern of change is partly different in the two models.  
In Table B5, we show such correlations for more scenarios and they confirm that production 
or net trade effects in the HME model is often less correlated with all other results.  In some 
cases, results from the HME and wage gap models are even opposite. These are shown by 
shaded cells in Table B5. These cases are nevertheless exceptions and in the majority of 
cases, the direction of the effects is similar in the two models. Base on the comparison, we 
conclude:   
- The HME model and the wage gap model behave qualitatively similarly for scenarios 
with European regional integration; in the sense that welfare results, and production vs. 
wages, are positively correlated. 
- For the SPATIAL scenario where distance-related trade costs are reduced, the two 
models give opposite predictions, as in Diagrams 7-8.  
- For EASTOPEN, the HME model suggests that unilateral liberalization gives a welfare 
loss while the opposite is the case for the wage gap model. This illustrates that the wage 
gap model is more “trade-friendly” than the HME model, where unilateral protectionism 
may sometimes improve welfare.  
Hence in some cases, the results depend on the type of model used. It is ultimately an 
empirical issue what is true, although – as argued – we have more faith in the wage gap 
model as an average effect across sectors for the whole economy.  
 This concludes our methodological examination of the model. The challenge for 
numerical modeling is to show that results are not only stories with limited generality based 
on some arbitrary parameter values. We believe to have shown that the results that are 
presented in the following are more than this. They hold for a wide range of parameter 
values, and we have illuminated some of the model mechanisms that create the results.  
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4. Model simulation results 
 
 
The numerical modeling results are intended as a point of departure for empirical 
examination of the issues. Therefore, a wide variety of scenarios and results are included. 
We will here only briefly sum up some main results. In Appendix C, Tables C1-C18 and the 
corresponding Diagrams C1-C18 we report results from scenarios 2-10. We only report 
results for the wage gap model with an intermediate level of trade costs.18 For each scenario, 
the tables include nominal wage levels and welfare levels, and changes in these from some 
other scenario (specified in the tables, often the WEST scenario). For each table, there is a 
corresponding grey-scale map graph which shows changes for each region, with some key 
words in the header. We generally do not repeat much detail in the main text so the readers 
are invited to use these graphs in Appendix C as an intuitive visualization of the results.  
 The results encompass standard results about regional integration from the new 
trade theory (see e.g. Baldwin and Venables 1995 for an overview) where participating 
countries gain and outsiders may sometimes lose. As shown in this literature, an 
“agglomeration shadow” may fall on non-participants close to the trade bloc. In standard 
HME or NEG models, this effect is driven by net export effects and so-called “production-
shifting”. In the wage gap model, there is no such production-shifting and the agglomeration 
shadow takes the form of lower nominal and real wages. Another new feature in our analysis 
is that positive and negative effects vary across regions inside countries. 
 The results clearly indicate that there is no unambiguous conclusion about how 
international integration affects domestic regions. All our scenarios represent international 
integration, but the impact on regions is different in each case. By the same reasoning, we 
cannot expect any unambiguous conclusion about regional inequality: International 
integration may lead to convergence in some cases, and divergence in others. Our analysis 
has therefore provided the “non-answer” we were searching for: There is no unambiguous 
rule, and searching for a universal answer is like barking under the wrong tree.  
 Our simulations include four regional integration scenarios; WEST, WIDER, EAST-
WEST and EAST. In all the four cases, all the participating regions unambiguously gain in 
terms of welfare. Hence also in the case of widening integration from 4 to 6 and 7, the old 
members improve real wages. The gains are to some extent unevenly distributed: 
- In WEST, there is a larger gain for regions that are close to the centre of the WEST area, 
around the point where the four countries all border to each other. 
                                                 
18 Results from other scenarios used in the robustness checks in Tables B3-B5 can be provided upon request. 
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- In WIDER, the gain is larger in the new member states. For these, the gain is larger in 
the western regions, but for the old members W1-W4, the opposite is the case. Hence 
EAST-WEST is better for W3 and W4 than for W1 and W2, and better for eastern regions 
in these countries. EAST-WEST moves the centre of gravity in the regional integration 
area to the east.  
- EAST-WEST gives a strong welfare gain for the new participant (E2) and modest positive 
effects for all the old participants, with a slightly better outcome for regions closer to the 
new participant. According to this, present participants of European integration have no 
reason to fear further enlargement. 
- With Eastern integration (EAST),19  the larger country E1 generally gains less than the 
other two since without integration, it already benefits from its large country advantage. In 
the wage gap model, integration is better for the small countries by creating wage 
convergence.  
In some, but not all cases, the welfare gain from integration is accompanied by a nominal 
wage increase as well. This is however not always the case, as seen in Appendix C.   
 In a non-spatial model of regional integration, the “agglomeration shadow” or 
negative impact on outsiders apply to all countries outside. In our case, the integration 
shadow is clearly visible but it is stronger in outside regions close to the trade bloc that is 
formed. In the WEST scenario, the negative impact on wages as well as welfare is larger for 
Central/ Eastern European regions close to the WEST bloc, and weaker for remote regions.  
There is however a negative impact for all outside regions. This applies also to the impact of 
WIDER and EAST-WEST on the outsiders. 
 The results on European regional integration show that eastward widening of the 
trade bloc gradually moves the “centre of gravity” eastward, while former members also gain 
from integration. Since the centre of gravity then gets closer and closer to the centre of the 
rectangular grid, the benefits of integration will be strongly correlated with any measure of 
“market potential”. This strengthens the case for market potential approaches in the study of 
European integration (see e.g. Brülhart et al. 2004). Such a correlation between market 
potential and the impact of integration is however not present in all scenarios. For the “iron 
curtain” (IRON) scenario, WTO and especially SPATIAL (reduced distance costs) there may 
actually be a negative correlation, at least with simple market potential measure of the types 
introduced by Harris (1954):  
- While the “iron curtain” is bad for welfare all over Europe, it is particularly adverse for 
regions close to the curtain itself; in western regions in Central Europe, or eastern 
regions in WEST.  
                                                 
19 Observe that Eastern integration departs from a situation with WEST, so it is not the only trade bloc, like in the 
other three cases of regional integration. 
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- The WTO scenario is especially positive for countries and regions that do not participate 
in regional trade blocs. When “multilateral trade liberalization” (WTO) is undertaken in the 
presence of WEST, it is particularly positive for regions outside but close to WEST. But 
also members of the regional bloc gain from such liberalization. WTO liberalization 
erodes the European trade preferences and thereby dampens trade policy discrimination. 
- Reductions in spatial trade costs have a powerful equalising effect by being more 
positive for peripheral regions along the border of the rectangular space, in particular the 
regions far to the west and to the east. Observe that in this case the HME model and the 
wage gap model gives different predictions, and our simulation results are along the lines 
with the pattern shown in Diagram 8. 
Hence the spatial impact of different types of integration varies, and some trade reforms will 
lead to more income growth in regions with a lower market potential in the sense of Harris 
(1954).  
 Finally, observe that if capital cities are “hubs” so that business has to take place via 
the capital (scenario CAPITAL), it strongly boosts the real wage level in capital regions.20 In 
our Russia-like country E1, the hub effect is particularly severe for regions to the far east. 
For these regions, even some of their trade with neighbour regions has to pass through the 
capital, and this creates a sharp increase in trade costs. The hub effect is also more severe 
and negative for some regions in north-west E2 and north-west Eurasian E3: These regions 
can no longer exploit their geographical proximity to Europe but have to ship some of their 
goods indirectly via capitals. On the other hand, north-west E3 and south-east E3 are in fact 
relatively better off since the hub effect implies a rebalancing of regions within the two 
countries, by eliminating some of the geographical relative disadvantages. Hub-and-spoke 
effect inside countries tend to eliminate the east-west and north-south differences in the 
impact of various policies, since all peripheries in the country become peripheral, wherever 
they are located. If the distance to the capital is larger, as for eastern E3 in our map, the 
impact is worse. 
 Central European countries C1-C2 are strongly affected in a number of different 
scenarios, be it as part of a European integration scheme, or being in the shadow outside 
trade blocs to the west or to the east, or benefiting from “preference erosion” due to WTO 
liberalization, or being trapped closed to the iron curtain. Hence not only armies have rolled 
over Central Europe; our results suggest that the forces of economic geography are also 
strong compared to the more “quiet corners” to the west and to the east.  
 
                                                 
20 In Tables C17-18, we show the case when this capital hub effect occurs in a setting departing from the WEST 
scenario. We have also tried with other scenarios, and the impact is similar so we only report this case. The 
presence of hub effects may modify the analysis of changes between different scenarios, but we do not address 
this in order to avoid too much detail.   
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5. Concluding remarks 
 
 
The main purpose of this paper has been to provide an extended theoretical 
underpinning for the empirical study of European integration and regional income gaps in 
Europe. Carrying out such empirical work is an extensive task that has been left for future 
research. The model simulations show a number of different scenarios and a task for 
empirical analysis is to determine the relevance of each scenario. During the last decades, 
different trade reforms have occurred simultaneously (e.g. EU integration, East-West trade 
agreements, WTO or GATT liberalization, dissolution of the Soviet Union, fall of the iron 
curtain etc.). In the context of Central and Eastern Europe, a challenge is the phenomenon 
of “transition” which may imply that there is an extended period of institutional change from 
the former planning system to the market economy. Although the most dramatic change 
probably had occurred by the mid-1990s, some effects of this change may be long-lasting 
and possibly overshadow other events. 
Our analysis captures some mechanisms but certainly not all, and the development 
of European regions is certainly affected by other aspects that are not addressed by the 
model. Input-output effects constitute a core feature in regional CGE (computable general 
equilibrium) models that have been constructed for some European countries (see e.g.  
Bröcker and Schneider 2002).21 While our model has nine countries, it leaves out the rest of 
the world and this is surely a shortcoming. For example, the industrial change of Germany is 
surely affected by competition from Asia, which is left out in our framework. Hence the 
results should be interpreted with these reservations in mind.  
In spite of these limitations, the results provide a rich set of hypotheses about the 
spatial and regional impact of integration in Europe, which will hopefully be of use in further 
research in the field. The scenarios shed light on different policy events and give predictions 
about nominal as well as real income changes and their spatial variation. In Melchior (2008b) 
we use the results derived here as a platform for empirical analysis of European regions 
during 1995-2005. 
 
 
                                                 
21 With more factors of production, new effects may arise; for example, in Haaparanta (1998) trade-induced factor 
market competition can drive up factor prices and even cause a welfare loss in some cases. 
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Appendix A: The modelling framework 
 
We present the model here in a form which encompasses both models used in the 
numerical simulations; the wage gap model (which is the main approach) and the home 
market effect (HME) model (which is used for comparison and as a supplement to shed light 
on trade effects). 
 There are N regions. Each region, indexed i or j, has a single factor of production; 
labour, with endowment Li22 and wage wi. The total income of the economy is therefore 
Yi=wiLi. In order to keep notation simple, we use only one set of subscripts (not for regions 
and countries separately).  
Following a standard Dixit-Stiglitz approach, labour can be used in the production of 
individual varieties of manufactured goods under increasing returns to scale. For an 
individual variety xi produced in region i, there is, measured in labour units, a fixed production 
cost f, constant marginal costs c and trade costs tij for sales in market j.23 For a good 
produced in region i and sold in market j, the cost in value terms is equal to wi (f+ctijxij).  
Trade costs are expressed as a mark-up on marginal costs so tij≥1, e.g. a trade cost 
of 10% implies tij=1.1. For the purpose of the analysis here, we also allow non-zero trade 
costs in the home market, so tii may be larger than 1.24 For example, some Russian regions 
are huge with low population density, and it would be implausible to assume that internal 
trade costs are zero. While zero domestic trade costs are normally assumed in theoretical 
applications, it is technically no problem to have non-zero trade costs. We assume that tij>tjj; 
i.e. inter-regional trade may be thought to include the intra-regional cost plus some additional 
inter-regional cost. This assumption is plausible but also needed for the model to be well 
behaved. 
 We assume standard CES (constant elasticity of substitution) demand functions, so 
demand for a variety from region i in market j is equal to xij = pij-εPjε-1Dj where pij is the price of 
a variety from region i in market j, ε is the elasticity of substitution between varieties (with the 
standard assumption ε>1), Pj is the CES price index in region j, and Dj is the total value of 
manufactured goods sold in market j (we revert to how this is determined). With monopolistic 
competition, firms maximise profits πi=-fwi+ Σj (pij-wictij)xij, and we obtain the standard pricing 
condition pij=[ε/(ε-1)] wi ctij. Furthermore, free entry and exit imply that total profits have to 
                                                 
22 For the purpose of empirical analysis, it may sometimes be useful to think of this as “efficiency units” rather 
than population, in order to adjust for different productivities in the economy. 
23 We consider it simpler in terms of notation to express trade costs as a mark-up on marginal costs rather than 
the usual iceberg formulation where goods melt away in transport. The results are similar. 
24 In the results presented in the text, we have assumed zero trade costs within each region. Simulations including 
such trade costs, for example as a function of land area or population density, were however also tried and we 
therefore express the model in a form which allows this possibility. 
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equal sunk costs f, and as a consequence the total value of sales for a firm in region i will be 
εfwi.  
 Now write vij = xijpij for the value of sales of an individual firm from region i in some 
market j. Dividing vij by vjj, we can express the sales vij in some market j as a function of the 
home market sales vjj of firms in that market: Using the demand functions and the pricing 
condition, we obtain vij = vjj * (wi/wj)1-ε (tij/tjj)1-ε. Using this, the total sales of a firm in region i, ∑j 
vij=εfwi, can be written as  
 
∑j vjj (wi/wj)1-ε (tij/tjj)1-ε= εfwi  
 
or, moving the common term wi to the right hand side,  
 
∑j vjj wjε-1 (tij/tjj)1-ε= εf*wiε.  
 
For the N regions, we have N equations with 2N unknowns (vii, wi). In order to express this in 
matrix form, we define 
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T expresses the relative trade costs in all markets, relative to domestic supply. Using this, the 
equation system above can be written as 
 
(1)  TN×N × Diag (wiε-1) N×N × [vii] N×1 = εf × [wiε]N×1 
 
where Diag (wiε-1) N×N is the diagonal matrix with wiε-1 as diagonal elements, [vii] N×1 is a vector 
with vii (i.e. the home market sales of firms in each region) as elements, and [wiε]N×1 is a 
vector with wiε as diagonal elements. 
 The sales of all firms in market j must add up to Dj; i.e.  
∑i nivij=Dj. ni is the number of manufacturing firms in region i, and since there is no firm 
heterogeneity, and no sunk exports costs, all firms will sell a (large or small) positive amount 
in any market. Expressing all vij’s in terms of home market sales as above, we can put wi and 
vii on the right hand side and obtain the system of N equations  
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(2)  TN×N’× Diag (wi1-ε) N×N × [ni] N×1 
= Diag (vii-1) N×N × Diag (wi1-ε) N×N × [Di]N×1 
 
Combining (1) and (2) we have 2N equations with 3N unknowns (ni, vii and wi). By adding 
more structure we can reduce the number of unknowns to 2N and solve the system. The 
wage gap model and the HME model represent two alternative approaches: 
In the wage gap model, we assume that manufacturing is the only sector in the 
economy. Then the whole income is spent on manufactured goods so we have Di=wiLi. 
Given that firm size is determined (see above) and assuming full employment, the number of 
manufacturing firms must be ni= wiLi/(εfwi)= Li/(εf). Thereby eliminating the unknowns ni, we 
obtain a system with 2N unknowns that may be solved. Equation (2) then simplifies to:  
 
(2a)  TN×N’× Diag (wi1-ε) N×N × [Li] N×1 
= εf × Diag (vii-1) N×N × Diag (wi2-ε) N×N × [Li]N×1 
 
This is however a non-linear system where no explicit analytical solution can be found.25 We 
therefore use numerical simulation in order to determine the outcome. As noted, we call this 
the wage gap model since differences in market access show up in different wages. For 
example, large regions will, ceteris paribus, have higher wages, a shown already by 
Krugman (1980).  
 In the numerical simulations, it requires more time and is computationally less 
efficient to run the whole system with 2N equations; it is better to express [vii] N×1 as a 
function of the wage and insert in (2a). We then simulate (2a) with the N wage levels as the 
only unknown. Given that no explicit matrix solution is available, an approximate solution has 
to be found by numerical iteration. In the simulations, we minimize the function 
 
∑ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −i
i
i
RHS
LHS
2
1  
 
where LHS and RHS refers to the left hand side and right hand side, respectively, of each of 
the 90 equations. In order to have the exact solution this sum would have to become zero but 
that is generally not possible. Hence we have to decide some upper threshold for this sum of 
squared deviations and find an approximation to the solution. In all then simulations 
presented, the values of Fi was below one, and below 0.5 in the most important scenarios. 
The accuracy depends on computer time and the number of iterations. For the scenarios 
simulated here and with the ranges of parameter values used, we obtained strictly positive 
                                                 
25 We did actually solve it for the case with two countries and ε=2, but in the general case an explicit solution is 
hard to find. Note also that in (2a) we cannot “abbreviate” the similar terms on the left and right hand sides, since 
in general, for three matrices A, B and C, AC=BC does not necessarily imply that A=B. 
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solutions in all cases. The results were also checked, e.g. by computing trade flows and 
checking adding-up properties and this indicated a high degree of accuracy. 
Observe also that the nominal level of wages, prices and sales is not determined and 
may be scaled up or down. We therefore have to normalise all results since the numerical 
results may end up at different levels. Since productivity is unchanged throughout the 
“events” we simulate, we normalise the average wage to equal one. 
A second option, frequently used in the literature and referred to as the HME model, 
is to add a “numeraire sector” in which labour produces a homogeneous good with constant 
returns to scale. Assuming that one unit of labour produces one unit of output of the 
homogeneous good and that such goods are traded at zero trade costs, wages per efficiency 
unit in the regions must be equalised as long as all regions produce the homogeneous good. 
Using the homogeneous good as numeraire, wages everywhere must then equal one; wi=1 
for all i. The version here is a slightly modified and multilateralised version of the “home 
market effect model” of Krugman (1980). We must also address how consumption is divided 
between the two types of goods; using a Cobb-Douglas upper-tier function with consumption 
share α for manufacturing, total demand for manufacturing becomes Dj= αLj (since total 
income is now Lj). In the multilateral version, equation (1) simplifies to TN×N × [vii] N×1 = εf × 
[1]N×1 (i.e. with a unit column on the right hand side). The solution for [vii]NxN can then be 
found. Equation (2) becomes 
 
(2b)  TN×N’× [ni] N×1 = α ×Diag (vii-1) N×N × [Li]N×1 
 
Using the solutions for vii, we can then also solve for the number of firms, and it can be 
shown that, ceteris paribus, large countries will have a higher than proportionate share of 
manufacturing. 
 In the wage gap model, the advantage of better market access is realised in the form 
of a higher nominal wage per efficiency unit, whereas in the home market effect model, the 
advantage appears in the form of manufacturing agglomeration. Corresponding to these two 
outcomes, the trade patterns also differ: In the wage gap model, external trade in 
manufactured goods has to be balanced and all trade is intra-industry trade. In the home 
market effect model, trade in manufactured goods may be unbalanced, but has to be 
matched by a compensating trade imbalance for homogeneous goods.26  
 In the HME model, we can use the CES price index for manufactured goods as a 
measure of welfare per capita. It is analytically convenient to use Ri=Pi1-ε as an indicator of 
                                                 
26 Whereas bilateral trade flows for manufactured goods are determined in this model, only the aggregate trade 
balance for homogeneous goods is determined, not the bilateral flows. Hence different patterns of bilateral trade 
in homogeneous goods are possible, and additional assumptions are needed to pin down the exact pattern. For 
the purpose of evaluating e.g. income or welfare, this is however not a problem or shortcoming. 
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welfare (which can be done since it is monotonically related to Pi). We can then express the 
vector [Ri]N×1 in matrix form as 
 
(3b) [ ] ( )[ ] [ ]nTtDiagR iiii NNNN NN 111 '1 1 1 ××−× ×××⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −= − − ×εεε ε  
 
From (2b) we can find the solution for [ni] and substitute into (3b). The components T’×(T’)-1 
then cancel out and we obtain the expression  
 
(3c) [ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ] [ ]LvDiagtDiag iiiiii NNNNNNR 111 11 11 ×××−× ×××⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −×= −− −εεεα ε  
 
Since the inverse of a diagonal matrix is a diagonal matrix with inverse diagonal elements, 
we can also write   
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We observe that for region i, welfare is positively related to home market size Li, and 
inversely related to the home market sales of firms (vii) as well as domestic trade costs (tii).27 
The intuition is that  
- in economically large regions that  have a higher share of production, consumers buy a 
larger fraction of goods from domestic producers and thereby pay less trade costs (since 
tij>tjj)  
- domestic trade costs increase prices and reduce welfare 
- if firms sell a large share of production domestically, it reflects that inter-regional trade 
costs are high and that reduces welfare. 
In this model, the world total number of firms is constant (=∑iLi/(εf)) so there is no welfare 
effect of changes in the number of varieties. 
 In the wage gap model, welfare depends on nominal wages as well as the price level. 
Welfare can then be measured directly by the CES quantity aggregator or utility function 
Xi=[∑i xi1-ε]1/(1-ε). Since total consumption equals total income; i.e. for region i we have 
XiPi=wiLi, we simply obtain that per capita welfare is equal to 
 
(4) 
P
w
L
X
i
i
i
i =  
 
                                                 
27 In most simulation results presented in the paper, we assume that Li=1 for all regions and that there are no 
domestic trade costs, tii=1. In that case, we can directly use vii as an index of welfare. 
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Using numerical solutions for wi, we can derive Pi and use this expression to evaluate 
welfare. 
 The wage gap model can actually be solved analytically in the case of two regions, 
symmetrical trade costs t12=t21=t and ε=2. Using the notation L=L1/L2, z=1- ε and x=(w2/w1)2, 
the system has three roots of which two are complex. The third root, which is used for some 
numerical illustrations in the text, is equal to 
 
(5)   
( ) ( ) ( )231
3
1
23
3
1
232
3
1
2
2
23
4
43
2
3
2
L
bab
babL
a
L
tLtx
zz
×
+++
++
−+=  
 
where  
 
zzzz ttLtLtLa 432242 46 −−−=  
 
and  
 ( ) ( )( )zzzzz tLtLtLtLtLb 22223234 2292227 ++−++=  
 
In some special cases, the square root term in (5) can become negative so that the root of x 
becomes complex. In the text, we use this equation to simulate how the model behaves for 
different parameter values (Diagram 2). 
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Table B1: Parameter values in model simulations 
(common values in all simulations, and specific changes in each 
scenario) 
     
Elasticity of substitution 
5 in all simulations except 
for Diagram 2 in text, 
where ε=2 since the 
solution (5) from Appendix 
A is used.. 
Level of trade costs 
 High 
Inter-
mediate/ 
main 
Low 
Abbreviated name High Main Low 
Scaling of distance (equal to maximum 
of spatial trade cost) 2.5 0.5 0.25 
Other regions intra-
nationally  0.5 0.1 0.05 
In regional trade blocs 0.75 0.2 0.1 
Trade costs 
that are 
independent 
of distance To/from countries 
outside trade bloc 1.0 0.3 0.15 
     
Specific adjustments in each scenario: 
SPATIAL: Distance scaling changed to 2 0.25 
WTO: Barriers to/from countries outside 
trade bloc reduced to 0.9 0.25 
EASTOPEN: E2’s trade costs increased 
to 1.5 0.5 
IRON: Non-spatial barriers between 
WEST and the rest changed to 10 10 
Not 
calcu-
lated 
Regional integration scenarios (WEST-WIDER and EAST-WEST): 
The level of trade costs applying to trade blocs applied to the relevant 
members in each case. 
CAPITAL: A separate matrix of trade costs was calculated where all 
trade with and inside the three countries to the east (E1, E2 and E3) 
had to pass through the capitals. The designated capitals were regions 
(5,11), (2,11) and (2,14). Distances were recalculated. Trade costs were 
then calculated using the average between this and the ordinary 
distance matrix, with equal weights. 
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Table B2: Illustration of the level of trade costs used in the simulations 
Level of trade costs between regions in the “WEST” scenario, country averages 
(percentage levels) 
High level of trade costs 
Receiving country: 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 C1 C2 E1 E2 E3 Ave-rage 
W1 69 129 129 149 203 214 278 261 309 193 
W2 129 69 149 129 214 203 285 253 303 193 
W3 129 149 69 129 154 174 228 214 261 168 
W4 149 129 129 69 174 154 238 203 253 166 
C1 203 214 154 174 69 154 179 174 214 171 
C2 214 203 174 154 154 69 194 154 203 169 
E1 278 285 228 238 179 194 87 164 164 202 
E2 261 253 214 203 174 154 164 69 154 183 
E3 309 303 261 253 214 203 164 154 69 214 
Average 193 193 168 166 171 169 202 183 214  
Intermediate level of trade costs (main case) 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 C1 C2 E1 E2 E3 Ave-rage 
W1 14 31 31 35 51 53 66 62 72 46 
W2 31 14 35 31 53 51 67 61 71 46 
W3 31 35 14 31 41 45 56 53 62 41 
W4 35 31 31 14 45 41 58 51 61 41 
C1 51 53 41 45 14 41 46 45 53 43 
C2 53 51 45 41 41 14 49 41 51 43 
E1 66 67 56 58 46 49 17 43 43 49 
E2 62 61 53 51 45 41 43 14 41 45 
E3 72 71 62 61 53 51 43 41 14 52 
Average 46 46 41 41 43 43 49 45 52  
Low level of trade costs 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 C1 C2 E1 E2 E3 Ave-rage 
W1 7 15 15 17 25 26 33 31 36 23 
W2 15 7 17 15 26 25 33 30 35 23 
W3 15 17 7 15 20 22 28 26 31 20 
W4 17 15 15 7 22 20 29 25 30 20 
C1 25 26 20 22 7 20 23 22 26 22 
C2 26 25 22 20 20 7 24 20 25 21 
E1 33 33 28 29 23 24 9 21 21 25 
E2 31 30 26 25 22 20 21 7 20 23 
E3 36 35 31 30 26 25 21 20 7 26 
Average 23 23 20 20 22 21 25 23 26  
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Table B3: Correlations between results from different simulations, the WIDER scenario 
Model  Wage gap model HME model 
Variable  Wage Domestic sales  (in own region) Price index Welfare Firms 
Dom. 
sales  
 Scenario High Main Low High Main Low High Main Low High Main Low High High 
High 1.00 0.97 0.89 -0.99 -0.93 -0.83 -0.99 -0.96 -0.93 1.00 0.96 0.94 0.71 -0.96 
Main 1.00 0.93 -0.96 -0.96 -0.88 -0.95 -0.99 -0.98 0.96 1.00 0.98 0.54 -0.87 Wage 
Low 1.00 -0.91 -0.90 -0.72 -0.92 -0.92 -0.91 0.91 0.93 0.97 0.53 -0.84 
High 1.00 0.92 0.78 1.00 0.95 0.92 -1.00 -0.95 -0.93 -0.72 0.97 
Main 1.00 0.93 0.91 0.98 0.99 -0.92 -0.97 -0.97 -0.47 0.83 Dom. Sales Low 1.00 0.77 0.92 0.94 -0.80 -0.90 -0.87 -0.32 0.67 
High 1.00 0.94 0.91 -1.00 -0.95 -0.93 -0.74 0.98 
Main 1.00 0.99 -0.95 -1.00 -0.99 -0.52 0.86 Price Index Low 1.00 -0.92 -0.99 -0.98 -0.46 0.82 
High 1.00 0.96 0.94 0.73 -0.97 
Main 1.00 0.99 0.53 -0.87 
Wage 
gap 
model 
Welfare 
Low 1.00 0.50 -0.85 
Firms High 1.00 -0.85 HME 
model Dom. High  1.00 
Note: Pearson correlation coefficients, N=90. All results are statistically significant at the 1% level or better  
(P=0.0002 in one case, P<0.0001 in all other). 
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Table B4: Correlations between changes from WEST to WIDER, for  different simulations and variables 
Model  Wage gap model HME model 
Variable  Wage Dom. sales (in own region) Price index Welfare Firms 
Dom. 
sales  
 Scenario High Main Low High Main Low High Main Low High Main Low High High 
High 1 0.96 0.90 -0.96 -0.79 -0.94 -0.95 -0.91 -0.91 0.99 0.96 0.91 0.56 -0.97 
Main  1.00 0.95 -0.91 -0.73 -0.90 -0.90 -0.91 -0.93 0.94 0.97 0.94 0.44 -0.90 Wage 
Low   1.00 -0.93 -0.84 -0.87 -0.93 -0.97 -0.98 0.93 0.98 0.99 0.39 -0.88 
High    1.00 0.89 0.93 1.00 0.97 0.96 -0.99 -0.96 -0.95 -0.53 0.97 
Main     1.00 0.89 0.91 0.94 0.92 -0.86 -0.86 -0.90 -0.29 0.80 Dom. Sales 
Low      1.00 0.92 0.94 0.94 -0.94 -0.94 -0.92 -0.36 0.88 
High       1.00 0.97 0.96 -0.99 -0.96 -0.96 -0.52 0.97 
Main        1.00 1.00 -0.96 -0.98 -0.99 -0.38 0.91 Price Index 
Low         1.00 -0.95 -0.99 -1.00 -0.36 0.89 
High          1.00 0.97 0.95 0.55 -0.98 
Main           1.00 0.99 0.42 -0.92 
Wage 
gap 
model 
Welfare 
Low            1.00 0.37 -0.90 
Firms High             1.00 -0.70 HME 
model Dom. sales High              1.00 
Note: Pearson correlation coefficients, N=90. All results are statistically significant at the 1% level or better (0.0001<P<0.005 in six cases, P<0.0001 
in all other). 
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Table B5: Do different models and levels of trade costs give similar results? 
High level of trade costs Intermediate 
 Wage Welfare Firms Dom. sales Wage  Welfare
Wage 1 1.00 0.36 -0.96 0.98 0.98 
Welfare  1.00 0.39 -0.97 0.98 0.98 
Firms   1.00 -0.60 0.24 0.23 
Dom. sales    1.00 -0.92 -0.91 
Wage      1.00 1.00 
WEST 
Welfare      1.00 
Wage 1 0.99 0.56 -0.97 0.96 0.96 
Welfare  1.00 0.55 -0.98 0.94 0.97 
Firms   1.00 -0.70 0.44 0.42 
Dom. sales    1.00 -0.90 -0.92 
Wage      1.00 0.97 
WIDER 
Welfare      1.00 
Wage 1 0.74 0.41 -0.73 0.98 0.38 
Welfare  1.00 0.42 -0.95 0.70 0.90 
Firms   1.00 -0.63 0.38 0.25 
Dom. sales    1.00 -0.69 -0.82 
Wage      1.00 0.33 
IRON 
Welfare      1.00 
Wage 1 0.95 0.23 -0.86 0.77 0.94 
Welfare  1.00 0.35 -0.95 0.89 0.97 
Firms   1.00 -0.60 0.23 0.19 
Dom. sales    1.00 -0.83 -0.87 
Wage      1.00 0.94 
WTO 
Welfare      1.00 
Wage 1 0.99 0.39 -0.97 0.47 0.95 
Welfare  1.00 0.33 -0.96 0.41 0.95 
Firms   1.00 -0.56 0.28 0.20 
Dom. sales    1.00 -0.45 -0.90 
Wage      1.00 0.61 
EAST 
Welfare      1.00 
Wage 1 0.38 -0.30 -0.01 0.03 0.05 
Welfare  1.00 -0.44 -0.41 0.43 0.37 
Firms   1.00 -0.61 -0.70 -0.70 
Dom. sales    1.00 0.37 0.42 
Wage      1.00 1.00 
SPATIAL 
Welfare On shaded cells, see main text for explanation  1.00 
Wage 1 0.99 0.61 -0.98 0.94 0.98 
Welfare  1.00 0.61 -0.98 0.91 0.97 
Firms   1.00 -0.74 0.52 0.52 
Dom. sales    1.00 -0.89 -0.94 
Wage      1.00 0.97 
EAST-WEST 
Welfare      1.00 
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Table B5: Do different models and levels of trade costs give similar results? 
High level of trade costs Intermediate 
 Wage Welfare Firms Dom. sales Wage  Welfare
Wage 1 -0.96 0.92 -0.60 1.00 -0.98 
Welfare  1.00 -0.83 0.41 -0.97 0.99 
Firms   1.00 -0.80 0.89 -0.87 
Dom. sales    1.00 -0.55 0.48 
Wage      1.00 -0.99 
EASTOPEN 
Welfare On shaded cells, see main text for explanation.  1.00 
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Table C1: Nominal wages – scenario WEST 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (percentage deviation from average) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 -1.8 -0.7 0.1 0.5 0.9 1.0 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 0.7 0.6 0.3 -0.3 -1.1 -2.3 
5 -1.1 0.1 0.9 1.3 1.7 1.8 0.1 0.3 0.1 1.4 1.3 1.0 0.4 -0.5 -1.7 
4 -0.8 0.4 1.2 1.7 2.1 2.1 0.4 0.5 0.4 1.6 1.5 1.2 0.6 -0.3 -1.6 
3 -0.8 0.4 1.2 1.7 2.1 2.1 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.0 -0.6 -1.1 -1.8 -3.0 
2 -1.1 0.1 0.9 1.3 1.7 1.8 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.8 -1.3 -2.0 -3.1 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 -1.8 -0.7 0.1 0.5 0.9 1.0 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -1.0 -1.5 -2.0 -2.7 -3.7 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario “base case without integration” 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 
5 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 
4 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 
3 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.1 0.9 -0.8 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 
2 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C2: Welfare (real wages) – scenario WEST 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (index using average from scenario Europe-4 = 100) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 95.6 98.0 99.7 100.8 101.7 102.0 98.8 99.1 98.8 101.6 101.5 100.8 99.6 97.7 95.1 
5 97.1 99.7 101.5 102.6 103.6 103.9 100.4 100.8 100.5 103.3 103.2 102.5 101.1 99.1 96.4 
4 97.7 100.4 102.2 103.4 104.4 104.6 101.0 101.4 101.1 103.8 103.6 102.9 101.5 99.5 96.7 
3 97.7 100.4 102.2 103.4 104.4 104.6 101.0 101.4 101.1 100.8 100.2 98.9 97.8 96.2 93.7 
2 97.1 99.7 101.5 102.6 103.6 103.9 100.4 100.8 100.5 100.2 99.7 98.4 97.3 95.8 93.4 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 95.6 98.0 99.7 100.8 101.8 102.1 98.8 99.1 98.9 98.6 98.0 96.8 95.8 94.3 92.1 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario “base case with no integration” 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.0 2.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
5 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.2 2.9 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
4 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.7 3.4 3.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
3 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.7 3.4 3.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 
2 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.2 2.9 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.0 2.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C3: Nominal wages – scenario “iron curtain (IRON)” 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (percentage deviation from average) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 -0.8 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.7 -0.1 -2.5 -1.6 -1.2 0.0 0.4 0.3 -0.1 -0.8 -1.9 
5 0.0 1.1 1.5 2.0 1.7 0.8 -1.8 -0.8 -0.4 0.9 1.2 1.2 0.7 -0.1 -1.3 
4 0.4 1.4 1.9 2.3 2.0 1.1 -1.6 -0.6 -0.1 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.0 0.2 -1.1 
3 0.4 1.5 2.0 2.3 2.0 1.1 -1.6 -0.6 -0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.1 -0.8 -1.4 -2.4 
2 0.1 1.1 1.6 1.9 1.7 0.8 -1.8 -0.8 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.9 -1.5 -2.6 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 -0.7 0.2 0.6 1.0 0.7 -0.1 -2.4 -1.5 -1.1 -0.9 -0.8 -1.1 -1.7 -2.2 -3.2 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario WEST 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.4 -0.2 -1.1 -1.9 -1.1 -0.6 -0.6 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4 
5 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.0 -1.0 -1.9 -1.1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
4 1.2 1.1 0.7 0.7 0.0 -1.0 -2.0 -1.1 -0.5 -0.4 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 
3 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.0 -1.1 -2.0 -1.1 -0.5 -0.1 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 
2 1.2 1.1 0.7 0.6 0.0 -1.0 -1.9 -1.0 -0.4 -0.1 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.6 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.4 -0.2 -1.1 -1.8 -1.1 -0.5 -0.2 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C4: Welfare (real wages) – scenario “iron curtain (IRON)” 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (index using average from scenario WEST = 100) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 85.8 87.5 88.2 88.5 88.0 86.3 87.5 89.3 90.2 93.8 94.7 94.7 94.0 92.5 90.2 
5 87.5 89.4 90.2 90.5 89.9 88.0 88.9 90.9 91.9 95.6 96.4 96.5 95.7 94.1 91.6 
4 88.1 90.2 91.0 91.3 90.6 88.7 89.3 91.4 92.5 96.1 96.9 96.9 96.1 94.5 92.0 
3 88.2 90.2 91.1 91.3 90.6 88.6 89.3 91.4 92.5 93.0 93.4 92.9 92.0 90.8 88.7 
2 87.5 89.5 90.3 90.5 89.9 88.0 89.0 91.0 92.0 92.5 92.9 92.4 91.6 90.5 88.4 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 85.8 87.6 88.3 88.6 88.0 86.3 87.5 89.4 90.4 90.8 91.2 90.7 89.9 88.9 87.0 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario WEST 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 -9.8 -10.5 -11.5 -12.3 -13.8 -15.8 -11.3 -9.8 -8.6 -7.8 -6.9 -6.1 -5.6 -5.2 -4.9 
5 -9.6 -10.3 -11.3 -12.1 -13.7 -15.9 -11.5 -9.8 -8.5 -7.7 -6.7 -6.0 -5.5 -5.1 -4.8 
4 -9.6 -10.2 -11.2 -12.1 -13.8 -16.0 -11.7 -10.0 -8.6 -7.7 -6.7 -6.0 -5.4 -5.0 -4.8 
3 -9.5 -10.2 -11.2 -12.1 -13.8 -16.0 -11.7 -10.0 -8.6 -7.8 -6.8 -6.1 -5.8 -5.3 -5.0 
2 -9.6 -10.2 -11.2 -12.1 -13.7 -15.9 -11.5 -9.8 -8.5 -7.7 -6.7 -6.0 -5.8 -5.3 -5.0 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 -9.8 -10.4 -11.4 -12.3 -13.8 -15.8 -11.3 -9.7 -8.5 -7.7 -6.8 -6.1 -5.9 -5.4 -5.1 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C5: Nominal wages – scenario WIDER 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (percentage deviation from average) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 -2.2 -1.1 -0.3 0.3 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.6 -1.4 -2.6 
5 -1.5 -0.4 0.5 1.1 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.5 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.1 -0.8 -2.0 
4 -1.3 -0.1 0.8 1.4 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.3 -0.6 -1.8 
3 -1.3 -0.1 0.8 1.4 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.1 1.9 -0.6 -0.8 -1.3 -1.6 -2.3 -3.4 
2 -1.6 -0.4 0.5 1.0 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.5 -0.9 -1.1 -1.6 -1.8 -2.5 -3.6 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 -2.2 -1.1 -0.3 0.2 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.7 -1.6 -1.8 -2.3 -2.5 -3.2 -4.2 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario WEST 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.7 1.5 1.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 
5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.7 1.6 1.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 
4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.8 1.6 1.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 
3 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.8 1.6 1.5 -0.8 -0.8 -0.7 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 
2 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.7 1.5 1.4 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.6 1.5 1.4 -0.9 -0.8 -0.8 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C6: Welfare (real wages) – scenario WIDER 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (index using average from scenario WEST = 100) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 96.3 98.8 100.6 101.9 103.0 103.5 103.7 103.6 103.0 101.2 101.2 100.6 99.3 97.5 94.9 
5 97.8 100.4 102.4 103.7 104.9 105.4 105.6 105.5 104.8 102.8 102.8 102.2 100.9 99.0 96.3 
4 98.4 101.1 103.1 104.5 105.7 106.2 106.4 106.3 105.6 103.3 103.2 102.6 101.3 99.3 96.6 
3 98.4 101.1 103.1 104.5 105.7 106.2 106.4 106.3 105.6 100.0 99.5 98.3 97.4 95.8 93.4 
2 97.8 100.4 102.4 103.7 104.9 105.4 105.6 105.5 104.8 99.4 99.0 97.8 96.9 95.4 93.1 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 96.2 98.8 100.6 101.9 103.0 103.5 103.7 103.6 103.0 97.8 97.3 96.2 95.4 94.0 91.8 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario WEST 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.5 4.9 4.5 4.2 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 
5 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 5.1 4.7 4.3 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 
4 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.6 5.4 4.9 4.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 
3 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.6 5.4 4.9 4.5 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 
2 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5 5.1 4.7 4.3 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.5 4.9 4.5 4.1 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C7: Nominal wages – scenario WTO 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (percentage deviation from average) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 -1.9 -0.9 -0.1 0.3 0.7 0.8 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 0.7 0.5 0.1 -0.5 -1.4 -2.6 
5 -1.2 -0.1 0.7 1.1 1.5 1.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 1.4 1.2 0.9 0.2 -0.7 -2.0 
4 -1.0 0.2 1.0 1.4 1.8 2.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.7 1.5 1.1 0.4 -0.5 -1.8 
3 -1.0 0.2 1.0 1.4 1.8 2.0 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.2 -0.4 -0.9 -1.7 -2.9 
2 -1.3 -0.1 0.7 1.1 1.5 1.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.2 -0.1 -0.7 -1.2 -2.0 -3.1 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 -1.9 -0.9 -0.1 0.3 0.7 0.8 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8 -1.4 -1.9 -2.7 -3.8 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario WEST 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 
5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 
4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 
2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C8: Welfare (real wages) – scenario WTO 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (index using average from scenario WEST = 100) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 96.6 99.1 100.9 102.1 103.1 103.6 101.8 102.1 101.8 103.9 103.6 102.7 101.3 99.3 96.6 
5 98.1 100.8 102.7 103.9 105.0 105.4 103.6 103.8 103.5 105.6 105.3 104.4 102.9 100.8 98.0 
4 98.7 101.5 103.4 104.7 105.8 106.2 104.3 104.6 104.2 106.3 105.9 105.0 103.5 101.3 98.4 
3 98.7 101.5 103.4 104.7 105.8 106.2 104.3 104.5 104.2 103.8 103.1 101.8 100.5 98.7 96.0 
2 98.1 100.8 102.7 103.9 105.0 105.4 103.6 103.8 103.5 103.1 102.5 101.1 99.9 98.1 95.6 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 96.6 99.1 100.9 102.0 103.1 103.6 101.8 102.1 101.8 101.4 100.7 99.5 98.3 96.6 94.2 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario WEST 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.5 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.5 
5 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.6 3.2 3.1 3.1 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.6 
4 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 3.3 3.2 3.2 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.7 
3 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.6 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.3 
2 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.5 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.2 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.5 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.1 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C9: Nominal wages – scenario Eastern integration (EAST) 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (percentage deviation from average) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 1.3 0.2 -0.4 -0.8 -1.0 -1.0 1.3 1.3 1.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.1 0.5 1.4 2.5 
5 0.5 -0.6 -1.3 -1.6 -1.8 -1.8 0.6 0.6 0.9 -1.3 -1.2 -0.8 -0.2 0.7 1.9 
4 0.2 -0.9 -1.6 -1.9 -2.2 -2.1 0.3 0.3 0.6 -1.6 -1.5 -1.1 -0.5 0.4 1.7 
3 0.2 -0.9 -1.6 -1.9 -2.2 -2.1 0.4 0.4 0.7 -0.7 -0.5 -0.1 0.5 1.4 2.6 
2 0.5 -0.6 -1.3 -1.6 -1.8 -1.8 0.7 0.7 0.9 -0.4 -0.2 0.3 0.8 1.7 2.8 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 1.3 0.2 -0.4 -0.7 -1.0 -0.9 1.4 1.4 1.7 0.4 0.6 1.1 1.6 2.4 3.5 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario WEST  
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.7 -0.9 -1.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.0 -0.7 -0.9 -1.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.0 -0.8 -0.9 -1.0 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 
2 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.8 -0.9 -1.0 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.8 -0.9 -1.0 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C10: Welfare (real wages) – scenario Eastern integration (EAST) 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (index using average from scenario WEST = 100) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 96.0 98.4 100.0 101.0 101.8 102.0 98.2 98.4 98.0 102.9 102.8 102.2 100.9 99.0 96.4 
5 97.5 100.1 101.8 102.8 103.7 103.8 99.9 100.1 99.7 104.7 104.6 104.0 102.7 100.6 97.9 
4 98.1 100.8 102.6 103.6 104.5 104.6 100.5 100.7 100.2 105.5 105.4 104.7 103.3 101.2 98.4 
3 98.1 100.8 102.6 103.6 104.5 104.6 100.4 100.6 100.2 103.6 103.3 102.3 101.1 99.2 96.6 
2 97.5 100.1 101.8 102.8 103.7 103.8 99.8 100.0 99.6 102.9 102.5 101.6 100.4 98.6 96.0 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 96.0 98.4 100.0 101.0 101.8 102.0 98.2 98.4 98.0 101.1 100.7 99.8 98.6 96.9 94.5 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario WEST 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.7 
3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9 2.9 3.1 3.4 3.3 3.1 2.9 
2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9 2.7 2.9 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.7 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9 2.5 2.7 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.5 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C11: Nominal wages – scenario SPATIAL (reduced spatial trade costs) 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (percentage deviation from average) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 -0.6 0.1 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.1 -0.8 -0.7 -0.8 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.0 -0.5 -1.2 
5 -0.2 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.3 -0.2 -0.9 
4 0.0 0.6 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.7 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.4 -0.1 -0.8 
3 -0.1 0.6 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.7 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.9 -1.4 -1.9 -2.5 
2 -0.2 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.7 -1.0 -1.5 -2.0 -2.6 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 -0.6 0.1 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.1 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8 -0.9 -1.1 -1.4 -1.9 -2.3 -2.9 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario WEST 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 1.2 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.1 
5 0.9 0.4 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.6 -0.5 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 0.3 0.8 
4 0.7 0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.1 0.2 0.7 
3 0.7 0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 0.0 0.4 
2 0.9 0.4 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 0.5 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 1.2 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.8 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C12: Welfare – scenario SPATIAL (reduced spatial trade costs) 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (index using average from scenario WEST = 100) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 103.6 105.1 106.2 107.0 107.6 107.8 103.9 104.1 103.9 107.2 107.0 106.5 105.7 104.4 102.9 
5 104.5 106.1 107.2 108.0 108.6 108.9 104.8 105.0 104.8 108.1 108.0 107.4 106.5 105.2 103.6 
4 104.8 106.4 107.6 108.4 109.1 109.3 105.2 105.4 105.2 108.4 108.2 107.7 106.8 105.5 103.8 
3 104.8 106.4 107.6 108.4 109.1 109.3 105.2 105.4 105.2 105.0 104.5 103.7 102.8 101.7 100.2 
2 104.5 106.1 107.2 108.0 108.6 108.9 104.8 105.0 104.9 104.6 104.2 103.4 102.5 101.4 100.0 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 103.6 105.1 106.2 107.0 107.6 107.9 103.9 104.1 103.9 103.7 103.3 102.5 101.7 100.7 99.2 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario WEST 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 8.0 7.1 6.5 6.2 5.8 5.8 5.1 5.0 5.1 5.6 5.5 5.7 6.1 6.8 7.8 
5 7.4 6.4 5.7 5.3 5.0 5.0 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.9 4.8 5.0 5.4 6.1 7.2 
4 7.1 6.1 5.4 5.0 4.7 4.7 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.6 4.6 4.8 5.2 6.0 7.0 
3 7.1 6.1 5.4 5.0 4.7 4.7 4.2 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.8 5.0 5.5 6.5 
2 7.3 6.3 5.7 5.3 5.0 5.0 4.4 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.6 5.0 5.2 5.7 6.6 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 8.0 7.1 6.5 6.1 5.8 5.8 5.1 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.7 5.9 6.3 7.2 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C13: Nominal wages – scenario EAST-WEST 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (percentage deviation from average) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 -2.1 -1.0 -0.2 0.2 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 -0.6 -0.5 -0.7 -1.2 -2.0 -3.1 
5 -1.5 -0.3 0.5 1.0 1.5 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.6 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -1.3 -2.5 
4 -1.2 0.0 0.9 1.4 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.9 0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.5 -1.3 -2.4 
3 -1.2 0.0 0.8 1.4 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.5 0.9 -2.6 -3.2 -4.2 
2 -1.5 -0.3 0.5 1.0 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.3 0.6 -2.8 -3.4 -4.4 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 -2.2 -1.0 -0.3 0.2 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.5 -0.1 -3.6 -4.1 -5.0 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario WIDER 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 
5 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.8 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 
4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.9 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6 
3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 2.5 2.3 2.2 -1.0 -0.9 -0.8 
2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 2.5 2.3 2.2 -1.0 -0.9 -0.8 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 2.5 2.3 2.2 -1.0 -0.9 -0.8 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C14: Welfare (real wages) – scenario EAST-WEST 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (index using average from scenario WEST = 100) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 96.7 99.2 101.0 102.3 103.4 104.0 104.2 104.2 103.7 100.6 100.6 100.1 98.9 97.1 94.6 
5 98.2 100.9 102.8 104.1 105.3 105.9 106.1 106.1 105.5 102.1 102.2 101.6 100.5 98.6 95.9 
4 98.8 101.6 103.6 104.9 106.1 106.7 106.9 106.9 106.4 102.5 102.5 101.9 100.8 98.9 96.2 
3 98.8 101.6 103.6 104.9 106.1 106.8 106.9 106.9 106.4 103.0 101.7 99.9 96.6 95.2 92.8 
2 98.2 100.9 102.8 104.1 105.3 105.9 106.1 106.1 105.7 102.5 101.2 99.4 96.1 94.7 92.4 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 96.7 99.2 101.1 102.3 103.5 104.1 104.2 104.3 103.9 100.8 99.6 97.9 94.5 93.2 91.1 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario WIDER 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 
5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 
4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.7 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 
3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 3.0 2.2 1.5 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 
2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.9 3.0 2.3 1.6 -0.9 -0.7 -0.6 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.9 3.0 2.3 1.7 -0.9 -0.7 -0.6 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C15: Nominal wages – scenario EASTOPEN 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (percentage deviation from average). NB: Levels with unilaterally higher barriers! 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 -2.0 -0.9 -0.2 0.1 0.5 0.6 -1.0 -0.9 -1.0 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.8 -1.6 -2.7 
5 -1.3 -0.2 0.6 0.9 1.3 1.4 -0.3 -0.1 -0.3 0.8 0.8 0.5 -0.1 -1.0 -2.2 
4 -1.0 0.1 0.9 1.3 1.6 1.7 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.1 -0.8 -2.0 
3 -1.0 0.1 0.9 1.2 1.6 1.6 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 3.7 3.6 3.0 -1.4 -2.2 -3.3 
2 -1.3 -0.2 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.3 -0.5 -0.3 -0.4 3.6 3.5 3.0 -1.6 -2.4 -3.4 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 -2.0 -0.9 -0.2 0.1 0.4 0.5 -1.2 -1.0 -1.2 2.9 2.8 2.3 -2.3 -3.0 -4.0 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from high barriers in E2 to scenario WEST 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 
5 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 
3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 -3.5 -3.6 -3.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 
2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 -3.6 -3.8 -3.8 0.3 0.3 0.3 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 -3.7 -3.8 -3.8 0.3 0.3 0.3 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
CASE Network Studies & Analyses No. 378 - European Integration and Domestic Regions:… 
 
 61
 
 
 
Table C16: Welfare (real wages) – scenario EASTOPEN 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (index using average from scenario WEST = 100) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 95.6 97.9 99.6 100.6 101.5 101.8 98.5 98.8 98.5 101.2 101.1 100.4 99.2 97.3 94.7 
5 97.1 99.6 101.3 102.4 103.3 103.5 100.1 100.4 100.1 102.8 102.7 102.0 100.7 98.7 96.0 
4 97.7 100.3 102.1 103.2 104.1 104.3 100.7 101.0 100.7 103.3 103.2 102.4 101.1 99.1 96.4 
3 97.6 100.3 102.1 103.1 104.0 104.3 100.6 100.9 100.6 94.2 93.9 92.8 97.5 95.8 93.4 
2 97.0 99.6 101.3 102.3 103.2 103.5 99.9 100.3 100.0 93.9 93.7 92.6 97.0 95.4 93.1 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 95.5 97.9 99.6 100.5 101.4 101.7 98.3 98.6 98.3 92.6 92.3 91.3 95.5 94.0 91.8 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from high barriers in E2 to scenario WEST 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 
5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 
3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 6.6 6.3 6.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 
2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 6.3 5.9 5.8 0.4 0.3 0.3 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 6.0 5.7 5.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C17: Nominal wages – scenario CAPITAL 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (percentage deviation from average).  
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 -2.3 -1.2 -0.4 0.1 0.6 0.8 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 1.0 1.4 0.9 -0.1 -1.3 -2.6 
5 -1.6 -0.5 0.4 0.9 1.4 1.6 0.5 0.7 0.6 1.7 2.7 1.7 0.5 -0.8 -2.3 
4 -1.4 -0.2 0.7 1.3 1.7 1.9 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.5 1.9 1.4 0.3 -0.9 -2.3 
3 -1.4 -0.2 0.7 1.3 1.8 2.0 0.8 1.0 0.9 -0.4 -0.1 -0.8 -1.7 -1.7 -2.5 
2 -1.6 -0.4 0.4 1.0 1.4 1.6 0.5 0.8 0.7 -0.2 0.7 -0.5 -1.4 -0.9 -2.3 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 -2.3 -1.2 -0.4 0.2 0.7 0.9 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.9 -0.6 -1.2 -2.1 -2.1 -2.9 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from scenario WEST 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.2 -0.1 -0.3 
5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 1.4 0.7 0.1 -0.4 -0.6 
4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 -0.1 0.4 0.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.7 
3 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 -0.6 -0.1 -0.2 -0.6 0.2 0.4 
2 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 -0.1 0.9 0.4 -0.1 1.1 0.9 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.4 0.5 0.6 -0.1 0.4 0.4 -0.1 0.6 0.8 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
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Table C18: Welfare (real wages) – scenario CAPITAL 
Results from numerical model simulations 
Levels (index using average from scenario WEST = 100) 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 95.1 97.5 99.2 100.3 101.3 101.7 98.8 99.1 98.9 100.5 101.0 99.5 96.9 93.9 90.6 
5 96.6 99.1 100.9 102.1 103.1 103.5 100.4 100.8 100.5 102.5 104.3 101.4 98.4 95.1 91.6 
4 97.2 99.8 101.7 102.9 103.9 104.3 101.0 101.4 101.2 102.1 102.6 101.0 98.3 95.2 91.7 
3 97.2 99.8 101.7 102.9 103.9 104.3 101.0 101.4 101.2 98.4 98.6 96.8 95.1 94.5 91.9 
2 96.6 99.2 101.0 102.2 103.2 103.5 100.4 100.8 100.6 98.6 100.1 97.1 95.5 96.0 92.4 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 95.1 97.5 99.2 100.4 101.4 101.7 98.8 99.2 98.9 96.7 96.9 95.3 93.8 93.2 90.9 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
Change in levels from from scenario WEST 
← West                                                                                                                 East → 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
W1 W3 C1 E1 
6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 -1.2 -0.5 -1.3 -2.7 -3.8 -4.5 
5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.8 1.1 -1.0 -2.8 -4.0 -4.8 
4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 -1.7 -1.0 -1.9 -3.2 -4.3 -5.0 
3 -0.6 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 -2.4 -1.6 -2.1 -2.7 -1.7 -1.8 
2 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 -1.6 0.4 -1.3 -1.8 0.2 -1.0 
↑ 
North 
 
 
South 
↓ 1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.9 -1.1 -1.6 -2.1 -1.1 -1.2 
 W2 W4 C2 E2 E3 
 
